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Abstract
Experience from the United Kingdom and the United States suggests that
expert evidence is often reshaped and repackaged by governments so that it
supports existing policy rather than informing policy decisions.
The Australian government based its decision to introduce FuelWatch on
evidence in the form of econometric work by the ACCC. This paper asks two
questions about that decision. First, was the policy shaped by the economet-
ric evidence or was the governments presentation of the evidence shaped by
the pre-determined policy? Second, is the econometric evidence su¢ ciently
robust as to support the FuelWatch policy?
I nd that some of the facts suggest that evidence was reshaped and
repackaged to support the FuelWatch policy. I also nd that the ACCC
analysis was not robust. Specically, they study the nominal retail margin
when economic theory suggests that analysis should focus on the real retail
margin to producers.
Using data digitized from a graph in the ACCC report I redo the econo-
metric analysis and nd that the evidence no longer unambiguously supports
the FuelWatch policy.
The ACCC claim that their analysis is robust because it has been subject
to scrutiny within the ACCC and by Treasury but such claims of robustness
cannot be veried because they refuse to release the data for public scrutiny.
Publication of data and analysis underpinning government decisions and
independent review of econometric work provides a more credible evidence
base for future policy decisions.
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1 Introduction
Stilgoe, Irwin and Jones (2006) provide a detailed discussion of evidence
based policy in the United Kingdom and the United States that sets the
context for this paper. They document cases where expert evidence was
often reshaped and repackaged by governments so that it supported existing
policy rather than informing policy decisions.
The decision to introduce a national FuelWatch scheme raises a number
of issues about the interplay between evidence and policy in Australia; see
Harding (2008a,b,c).
In this paper I focus on just two questions. First, was the policy shaped
by the econometric evidence or was the governments presentation of the
evidence shaped by the pre-determined policy? Second, is the econometric
evidence su¢ ciently robust as to support the FuelWatch policy?
2 Background to FuelWatch and the 2007 ACCC
report on petrol pricing
The national FuelWatch scheme which was announced on April 15 and is to
start on 15 December 2008 is based on the Western Australian governments
scheme of the same name that was introduced on 2 January 2001.
2.1 The 2007 ACCC report on petrol pricing
Petrol pricing has been a contentious issue in Australia and has been the
subject of a large number of inquiries. In many of these inquiries the ACCC
has voiced suspicion that the Western Australian FuelWatch scheme might
lead to increases in the average price of petrol. In late 2007 the ACCC
delivered a report on Petrol pricing that was very cautious about FuelWatch
stating that1
Assessing any system in the style of FuelWatch that incorpo-
rates increased price information and price commitment requires
great care due to the potential for anti-competitive as well as
pro-competitive benets. Although the inquiry gained a prelim-
inary assessment of the impacts in Perth from the scheme, it is
clear that a caseby-case approach is required to assess the poten-
tial impacts on competition of any similar scheme. In particular
1ACCC, 2007, Petrol prices and Australian consumers report of the ACCC inquiry
into the price of unleaded petrol, 18th December 2007
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the ACCC has not analysed the application of such a scheme to
rural and regional areas. Apparent extra considerations here in-
clude the increased potential for anti-competitive e¤ects due to
the more concentrated nature of the market, the extra cost in
initialisation, administration and compliance and how to decide
which areas to cover. In summary, there are potential benets and
potential costs of adopting a national price commitment arrange-
ment that need to be carefully considered.
Appendix S of the ACCC report provides an econometric analysis of
the Western Australian FuelWatch scheme. Changes to the relevant laws
in 2006 and at the end of 2007 provided the ACCC with new powers to
subpoena documents, data and witnesses.2 Mr. Graeme Samuel, Chairman
of the ACCC explained the propose of that econometric work to the Senate
Estimate inquiry
There has been an enormous focus on one particular half-page
of our report, the econometric analysis and appendix S of that
report. The econometric analysis which was described in appen-
dix S was undertaken with one purpose in mind, and that was
to determine whether or not FuelWatch had caused any harm to
Perth motorists since its introduction. It was designed to assess
whether FuelWatch had caused any increase in prices to Perth
motorists.
Source: Senate Committee Hansard, Standing Committee on
Economics, Estimates, Thursday 5 June 2008.
The ACCC claim that their analysis is robust because it has been subject
to scrutiny within the ACCC and by Treasury.3 However, neither the Senate
Estimates hearing nor the subsequent Senate Economics Committee hearing
could obtain a comprehensive description of the actions taken by Treasury
to scrutinize the ACCC econometrics.
2Mr Samuel, Chairman of the ACCC observed that,
the powers that were conferred upon us by then federal Treasurer, Peter
Costello, powers of subpoena, powers of ability to obtain evidence from In-
formed Sources that had never been available to us before and powers to
obtain data that enabled us to undertake econometric modelling.
3See Senate Hansard (Standing Committee on Economics) Estimates 5 June pages E29
and following.
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In many elds of endeavour information is not viewed as being evidence
unless the results can be replicated independently - what this means in prac-
tice varies but a minimum requirement is that the data be public and the
paper must have been subject to independent public scrutiny. Neither of
these minimum requirements were met in the case of FuelWatch.
Experience with evidence based policymaking in the United Kingdom
(UK), see Stilgoe, Irwin and Jones (2006), conrms that the absence of public
scrutiny often led to government agencies ltering out information that was
inconsistent with government policy. The UK experience also suggests that
internal review procedures and even review by other government agencies
have little value in protecting against such policy-based-evidence.
2.2 The government decision to introduce FuelWatch
On 15 April the Australian Cabinet decided to implement a national Fuel-
Watch scheme. The press release announcing that decision said that4
Econometric analysis undertaken by the ACCC last year con-
cluded that under theWAFuelWatch scheme the relevant weekly
average price margin was around 1.9 cpl [cents per litre] less on
average.
Initially the econometric analysis was designed to reassure the ACCC that
Fuel watch was not causing WA motorists to pay higher prices for petrol.5
Now the Government has transformed its use of the econometric analysis to
support a conclusion that FuelWatch had reduced the price of petrol to WA
motorists. This change in use is the rst evidence that we have a case of
policy-based-evidencerather than evidence-based-policy.
On 29 April the ACCC released a document "Further FuelWatch econo-
metric analysis undertaken by ACCC". The conclusion of that document is
as follows:
The purpose of this econometric analysis has been to satisfy
the ACCC that the introduction of a FuelWatch scheme nation-
ally would not, based on the experience in Western Australia,
lead to consumers paying higher prices for petrol.
4The Prime Minister also observed that
"The National FuelWatch Scheme is a key part of the Rudd Governments
response to the ACCC report into the price of unleaded petrol."
5See Graeme Samuel, Senate Hansard (Economics Committee), Estimates 5 June page
E20.
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From the econometric analysis, on a conservative basis, the
ACCC can say that there is no evidence that the introduction of
FuelWatch in Western Australia led to any increase in prices and
it appears to have resulted in a small price decrease overall.
The ACCC conclusion up until the 12 words and it appears to have re-
sulted in a small price decrease overallare unexceptional. They represent a
competition authority doing its job by reassuring the public that the exten-
sion of a scheme that it had previously viewed as possibly anti-competitive
was unlikely to hurt consumers. The only issue that one could take with this
statement is that the econometric analysis released by the ACCC may not be
of su¢ cient quality or su¢ ciently well explained to support the statement. I
return to this issue later in the paper.
The last 12 words in the ACCC statement go well beyond the ACCCs
brief and provide comfort to a government that was in political di¢ culty
over its decision to introduce a FuelWatch scheme. It is this part of the
ACCCs conclusion that supports the contention that it provided policy-
based-evidencerather than the reverse.
3 Assessing the ACCCs econometric analy-
sis
Objective criteria for determining a minimum standard of what constitutes
good econometrics can be extracted from instructions that Professor Ken-
neth D. West, Ragnar Frisch Professor of Economics, at the University of
Wisconsin gives to his students as a guide,
The objective of your project should not be to calculate many
numbers, nor to perform a long series of tests, but rather to learn
something about some interesting parameter(s). The paper will
be evaluated with respect to clarity of exposition, thoroughness
of description of the data and methods, competence in using
the methods, and thoughtfulness in interpreting results. Com-
plexity of economic theory and econometric methods does not
carry weight in the evaluation. Appropriateness of the theory
and methods to the project does carry weight. So does good
writing.6
Public sector econometric analysis that is intended to form a basis for
evidence based policy should aim to exceed these criteria.
6Source: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~kwest/teaching/econ880/econ880%20syllabus.pdf
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3.1 The ACCC data
The ACCC constructed a series that represents the di¤erence between the
nominal retail margin on petrol in Perth
 
mPertht

and the nominal retail
margin on petrol in the eastern capital cities mEastt . The ACCC described
this data as follows
The data series was constructed using pricing information sup-
plied by Informed Sources and Platts. The series tested was
a measure of price margin that removes factors from the retail
price that are beyond the scope of FuelWatch to a¤ect, such as
net taxes, fuel quality premiums and ex-renery petrol prices.
ACCC report p375.
Details of how the di¤erence in the nominal price margin, which I denote
as mt, are calculated are provided on page 375 of the ACCC report and the
formulasare set out below.
mPertht = (Retail price-lagged Mogas95 price-net taxes - fuel quality premium)Perth
mEastt = (Retail price-lagged Mogas95 price-net taxes - fuel quality premium)Average of eastern cap ita ls
mt= m
Perth
t  mEastt
Harding (2008b) discusses the aspects of the ACCCs description of how
the data is constructed that are incomplete. Most importantly, nowhere in
the ACCC report is it acknowledged that nominal price margins are used
in the econometric analysis whereas the relevant body of economic theory
relates to real price margins. For later use I dene the east-west di¤erence
real margin to service station owners
 
rmPt

and to consumers
 
rmCt

as
follows
rmPt =
mt
P Ft
rmCt =
mt
PCt
Where P Ft is the price index for fuel in the CPI and P
C
t is the All groups
headline measure of the consumer price index.
What does economic theory say about the properties of these three series?
Exit and entry of service stations is the economic process that can be expected
to stabilise the real producer margin so that it uctuates, without exhibiting
a time trend, about a constantthat reects the real retail margin at which
two conditions are met
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 entry of an additional service station is not protable; and
 exit by one service station would make entry by another protable.
I have put constantin inverted commas for three reasons. First, changes
in a variety of factors including the real interest rate, real (relative to petrol
prices) wages, and the real rental rates on land and capita will inuence
the real retail margin on petrol. Second the demand for petrol is heavily
inuenced by the calendar and this will cause the retail marginal to uctuate
with the calendar. The third reason is that if there is imperfect competition
then it is possible that the petrol stations set prices that uctuate through
coordination.
If the real retail margin to service stations is approximately constant
then the nominal margin should vary with the price of fuel P Ft . Specically,
the variance of the nominal margin should be proportional to the square
of P Ft : This feature makes the nominal margin (mt) unsuitable for econo-
metric analysis.7 A similar problem arises with rmCt as its variance will be
proportional to the square of P
F
t
PCt
:
Thus, the variable that is suitable for econometric analysis is the east-
west di¤erence in the real producer retail margin for petrol
 
rmPt

. Factors
such as interest rates and wage rates which are common between Perth and
the eastern capital cities should cancel out when this margin is calculated.
Thus rmPt should be determined primarily by the following factors
 di¤erences between Perth and the eastern capitals in calendar e¤ects;
 di¤erences between Perth and the eastern capitals in the e¤ects of the
new tax system that was introduced in 1999/20008; and
 the e¤ects of FuelWatch.
Once these factors are controlled for the residual should be comprised of
 Measurement error arising because the data was digitized;9
7The essence of the problem is that PFt is almost certainly integrated of order one so
that the variance of the nominal margin will be an integrated process. One can see this
feature from a graph of the nominal margin.
8Here it is important to understand that the new tax system involved much more than
the introduction of the GST. It also involved changes to capital gains taxes and to a range
of other taxes. Di¤erences between states in the physical size of the block of land on which
service stations are located, di¤erences in the storage tanks and number of bowsers per
service station and di¤erences in the income distribution of the population could interact
with the changes in the tax system to have di¤erential e¤ects on the petrol retail margin.
9Harding (2008a) provides evidence that the measurement error is small.
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 independent and identically distributed shocks that represent primarily
di¤erences between Perth and the eastern capitals in petrol demand
shocks
 a component that reects di¤erences between Perth and the eastern
capitals in any coordination of petrol stations in setting prices.
3.2 Appropriateness of theory and method
3.2.1 Model
The model (Model 1 (ACCC)) encompasses the two models used by the
ACCC viz the single structural break model in Appendix S of the ACCC
report and the two structural break model on the last page of the document
Petrol  Further Econometric Analysis Undertaken by ACCC that was re-
leased on 29 May 2008.
mt = ACCC + ACCCd1t + ACCCd2t + "ACCC;t (Model 1 (ACCC))
The single break case is easily obtained in from model 1 by setting
ACCC = 0: This is a restriction that can be tested and one will nd that
when d1t breaks in early May 2000 the restriction ACCC = 0 is strongly
rejected. Indeed from Table 1 one can see that the HACC robust t-statistic
is  4:2. Another way of looking at this is that the single break model in
Appendix S is not robust to the addition of an additional variable viz d1t:
There is also an important logical reason for including the second struc-
tural break  the ACCC report relies on a form of logic which says after
this therefore because of this. That is the identifying assumption that allows
the ACCC to relate the shift in mean after the introduction of FuelWatch
to FuelWatch. This form of logic is regarded with considerable suspicion in
the sciences. A simple example will show why. Since Christmas cards always
arrive before Christmas, this form of logic would say that Christmas cards
cause Christmas. The fundamental problem here is that there is an omitted
variable expectation of Christmas. Addition of a variable that measures
expectation of Christmaswill solve the problem as after adding this vari-
able one will no longer nd that Christmas cards cause Christmas. This
simple example shows how econometricians address their concerns about the
after this therefore because of thislogic  they add further variables and
see whether that changes the ndings. That is what I do here.
In model 1, the model used by the ACCC, the nominal petrol retail
margin mt is the variable to be explained. But as discussed in the preceding
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section, this specication is invalid and results in the variance of "ACCC;t being
proportional to to the square of P Ft something that precludes using regression
analysis. A sensible modication is to replace the dependent variable with
rmPt which leads to model 2.
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rmPt = P + Pd1t + Pd2t + "P;t (Model 2)
In model 2, rmPt is explained by a constant (P ) and two shift variables d1t
and d2t: The residual "P;t represents the part of the margin that is explained
by stochastic factors other than the constant and the two shift variables.11
The coe¢ cients P and P measure the extent to which the mean nominal
retail margin for petrol is changed after dates t1 and t2 respectively. The unit
of measurement for the coe¢ cients is cents per litre at fuel prices prevailing
in the week starting 25 August 1998 - a real quantity.
Decisions about when people drive, how far they drive and the timing
of their proximity to service stations are all a¤ected by the calendar and by
events such as public holidays and school holidays that are related to the
calendar. Thus, demand for petrol shifts with the calendar causing the price
of petrol to move with the calendar. To the extent that retail petrol prices
are set above marginal cost through (imperfect competition) retail margins
will also vary with the calendar. The ACCC makes no allowance for calendar
e¤ects in their modelling. In Harding (2008b) I discuss this issue in more
detail however for reasons of space and accessibility to a broad set of readers
I have omitted this material and have focused on the issue of replicating the
ACCC analysis.
Two types of non-stationarity are potentially present in the FuelWatch
data. The rst of these are structural breaks in the mean. These could arise
for example if
1. Changes in tax policy had di¤erent e¤ects on petrol station margins in
Western Australia to Eastern Australia. Importantly, the tax systems
was changed extensively through the period 1999 to 2001 with major
changes being made in mid 2000.
10One might ask why the margin is not set in constant real terms to the consumer. The
reason suggested by economic theory is this. If petrol stations set the margin in this way
then when the petrol price was increasing by more than the CPI they would go broke and
when the petrol price was increasing by less than the CPI they would be earning excess
prots that encouraged entry of new service stations thereby driving the margin down
11d1t takes the value 0 until week t1   1 and it takes the value 1 from week t1 through
to week t2   1.
d2t takes the value 0 until week t2   1 and it takes the value 1 from week t2 through to
the end of sample.
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2. New entrants to the industry such as Coles caused a reduction in the
margin obtained by Western Australian service stations;
3. The FuelWatch scheme had its intended e¤ect to reduce service station
margins.
The second form of non stationarity arises where the variance of a series
is a function of time. This arises in two main way. The rst is if the data
is a deterministic function of time so that rmPt   dt is stationary where dt
is deterministic function of time. Because of the e¤ect of the calendar on
petrol demand this is a plausible specication.
The second way that the variance of rmPt could be a function of time arises
where rmPt   dt can be written as the cumulation of a stationary series.12 In
this case the series can be written as13

 
rmPt   dt

= 
 
rmPt 1   dt 1

+
qX
i=1
i
 
rmPt 1   dt i

+ t (1)
Where  is the parameter of interest. If  = 0 this means that the series
rmPt has a unit root and the variance of rm
P
t will have a time trend.
This is a specication that is often found in macroeconomics but we
should question its plausibility for this data. If  = 0 it means that the
variance of
 
rmPt   dt

is proportional to time. So that at June 30 2007 the
variance of
 
rmPt   dt

would be 459 times as high as in the week beginning
1 August 1998 something that does not seem consistent with free entry into
and exit from petrol retailing.
There are also technical deciencies in the ACCC testing for unit roots
these are discussed in Harding (2008b) where I nd that after applying the
correct unit root tests we can conclude that
 
rmPt   dt

is stationary as sug-
gested by the theory related to free entry into and exit from petrol retailing.
3.2.2 Thoroughness of description of methods
As discussed above and in Harding (2008b,d) the ACCC leaves out much
of the information that is necessary to judge whether the unit root testing
has been applied correctly. A similar problem arises with the Newey West
standard errors that are reported in Table S2. The ACCC recognize that
serial correlation is present in the data and seek to correct that using Newey
West standard errors. There are two issues here,
12Strictly speaking the stationary series must also have positive spectral density at
frequency zero.
13 is the di¤erence operator. So xt = xt   xt 1:
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1. The key parameter in calculating the Newey West standard errors is
the window width used in the calculation. The ACCC does not tell us
what window width was used or how it was determined.
2. The ACCC does not provide diagnostics that might help us understand
how important is the problem of serial dependence in the data.
The ACCC report says that they searched for endogenous structural
breaks. However, no information is provided on how this search was con-
ducted. As search that attempted to minimize the sum of squared errors in
Model 1 would be incorrect as it would not allow for the presence of serial
correlation in those errors.
3.2.3 Estimating the e¤ect of FuelWatch for known break dates
Here I replicate the ACCC analysis using the correct dependent variable 
rmPt

: I assume that there are two break dates one in the rst week of May
2000 . The other in the rst week of January 2001 reecting the introduction
of FuelWatch in WA. The estimates, robust standard errors14 and robust
condence intervals are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Estimated coe¢ cients of Model 2
Coe¢ cient Estimate Robust
Standard Error 95% Condence Interval
P 1:23 0:22 (0:79; 1:67)
P  1:68 0:40 ( 2:48; 0:88)
P (FuelWatch)  0:29 0:36 ( 1:01; 0:43)
Since the robust 95% condence interval includes zero it is not possible,
based on this data to say, as the ACCC did, that the WA FuelWatch scheme
did not act to increase the real retail margin for petrol in Perth. The mean
estimated e¤ect is for a reduction of 0:29 1 August 1998 cents which translates
into about 0:52 of a cent in mid 2008.
One possibility is that the estimated e¤ects of FuelWatch are biased down-
wards because although the scheme came into e¤ect on 2 January 2001 it may
14The standard errors are calculated making use of the fact that the regres-
sors are deterministic. So that the covariance matrix for the estimators is
(X 0X) 1X 0
X (X 0X) 1where 
ij = E"P;i"P;j : Consistent estimators of the rst q au-
tocovariances were used to construct b
 resulting in a feasible and consistent estimate of
the covariance matrix using a q = 17. The covariance matrix hardly changes for values
of q between 10 and 100. Similar standard errors are obtained using the Newey West
procedure.
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not have had an e¤ect until some weeks later. To check this I allowed the
introduction of the FuelWatch to vary from 13 January 2001 to 3 March
2001. The resulting estimates for the FuelWatch coe¢ cient
bP are  0:24,
 0; 21,  0:18,  0:14.  0:14,  0:14 and  0:16: These estimates suggests
that assuming a 2 January 2001 start date provides an upper bound on the
point estimate of the e¤ect of FuelWatch.
3.2.4 Overall assessment
The approach of the ACCC does not stand up well against the criteria set
out at the beginning of this section. Specically,
1. The ACCC uses the incorrect dependent variable (the east-west di¤er-
ence in the nominal retail margin for petrol) rather than the east-west
di¤erence in the real producer retail margin for petrol.
2. Use of the incorrect variable results in more than misspecication be-
cause it means that the assumption of stationarity necessary for the
econometrics cannot hold.
3. The ACCC procedures cannot detect such non stationarity because
they apply the incorrect test to the incorrect variable. Moreover, as
discussed in Harding (2008b) their application of the test is awed
because the seem to use an incorrect lag length in the testing procedure.
4. The ACCC approach is one in which it has sought to use tests to
inoculateitself against criticism rather than trying to learn something
about some interesting parameter(s). This is the source of many of the
econometric aws in the ACCC analysis.
5. The reporting of the ACCC econometrics makes it di¢ cult to assess
precisely what the ACCC did.
6. When I redo the ACCC analysis using the correct dependent variable
and allowing for two structural breaks the data does not support the
ACCC conclusion that the FuelWatch scheme did not lead to increased
petrol prices in Perth.
That said Appendix S of the ACCC report provides a thoughtful discus-
sion of the caveats to their work. However, some important caveats such as
the issue of nominal versus real margin and the possible e¤ects of the tax
system introduced in 1999-2001 are neglected.
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A natural but incorrect response is to blame the econometricians who
undertook this work. The correct response is to recognise that the quality of
econometric work is almost always improved by public scrutiny and particu-
larly by seminars and workshops involving academics. Thus, it is the secrecy
of the ACCC, its refusal to release the data for independent analysis and
its refusal to subject its work to independent scrutiny that is the ultimate
source of the problem.
4 Who are the experts?
Who are the experts, is the central question that government, media and the
community are to avoid repeat episodes of policy based evidencelike that
encountered with FuelWatch.
Stilgoe Irwin and Jones (2006) observe that
The physicist Werner Heisenberg dened an expert as someone
who knows some of the worst mistakes that can be made in their
subject and who manages to avoid them. Expert wisdom is about
navigating uncertainty, reminding people in power what we still
might not know, in addition to what we think we know, and
cautioning against complacency.
This is a reasonable starting point for discussion but Heisenberg has de-
ned someone who has expertise rather than someone who is has su¢ cient
knowledge of the particular issue as to be regarded as an expert.
For econometric analysis the expert is the person who actually undertook
the econometrics and thus will have an intimate knowledge of the data and
the methods used. Such a person should also have an appreciation of the
qualications to the analysis, the mistakes that can be made and what was
done to make the analysis robust to these potential qualications. Whether
the person actually has the knowledge described can only be discovered by
asking them. It is rare to see such people give evidence at public inquiries
because they are typically very junior in the bureaucratic hierarchy. They
are, however, experts on the particular matter.
The second category of expert is the manager who supervised the per-
son(s) who performed the econometrics. Such people are experts because
they know the procedures and protocols that were used to ensure that the
econometrics were undertaken according to best practice. It is also relatively
rare for such people to appear at public inquiries.
The third category is the managers manager. Such people may or may
not have expertise as dened by Heisenberg but they denitely are not experts
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because they have little direct knowledge of what was done or how what was
done was supervised. It is usually the managers manager or some person
even further removed from direct experience with what was done who gives
the evidence at bureaucratic inquiries. Because they are so removed from
what was done the testimony of such people is largely useless in evaluating
whether the process under study was capable of turning information into
robust and tested evidence.
The ACCCs econometric work was discussed in the Senate estimates
economic committee on 5 June 2008 which heard evidence from a number of
o¢ cials including the ACCC Chairman, the Commissioners who were respon-
sible for the ACCC report and senior Treasury o¢ cials. None of the ACCC
o¢ cials that appeared before the Senate Committee as experts actually did
the econometrics for appendix S of the ACCC report. Nor were any of these
o¢ cials the immediate manager of the person(s) who did the calculations.
Thus, these o¢ cials may or may not have expertise but they cannot be said
to be experts in the econometric analysis of FuelWatch.
There is a fourth category of people with expertise that needs mentioning
- academics. Academics were excluded from the process because the ACCC
refused to release the data used in its report. In evidence to the ACCC Mr.
Samuel e¤ectively dismissed academics as a public nuisance stating that:
I am not in a position to be able to say that we would make our
data and our methodology available to anyone out in the public
arena. We are not prepared to make all this available for any
economic modeler or any economic student to simply go through
and then to engage the already heavily worked sta¤ of the ACCC
in debate on these issues. The commission of inquiry needed to
satisfy itself that the work that was done was robust and they
have done just that.15
In essence Mr. Samuel is saying that the ACCC sta¤who defend ordinary
Australians against anti-competitive behaviour by business cannot benet
from scrutiny by academics, students, journalists and the general public.
It is evident from the previous section that the ACCC would benet from
greater exposure to academic econometricians. It is also evident that public
policy would benet from such scrutiny.
In the event several academics did present evidence to the Senate Eco-
nomics Committee inquiry into FuelWatch. The coalitions senators dissent-
ing report evaluated the ACCCs reaction as follows,
15See Graeme Samuel, Senate Hansard (Economics Committee), Estimates 5 June page
E59-60.
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It is disappointing that when presented with this various evidence,
the ACCCs defence was to attack the witnesses rather than argue
the facts. It did not enhance their case.16
5 Reections on evidence-based policy mak-
ing in Australia
Shortly after winning the 2008 election the new Prime Minister rea¢ rmed
his commitment to evidence based policy making:.
I believe in evidence-based policy not just sort of grand state-
ments. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, 7.30 Report 27/11/2007
Experience suggests that several issues arise with the evidence-based ap-
proach.
First, public policy decisions create winners and losers who have consid-
erable incentives to distort the evidence or its interpretation. These winners
and losers may be commercial interests who have nancial incentives to pay
considerable sums of money to inuence or shape expertopinion. The bat-
tle of expertsthat ensues rarely sheds light on how the public interest can
be furthered.
Political interests also have strong incentives to inuence or shape ex-
pert opinion so as to achieve a political agenda. As Stilgoe, Irwin and Jones
(2006) observe it is very di¢ cult for bureaucrats to lean against the wind
created by the ambition of a minister. In the FuelWatch case there is a
cadre of well trained public servants in Treasury, Finance, Prime Minister
and Cabinet, ACCC and the various energy, resource and industry depart-
ments who have su¢ cient econometric expertise to see through the aws in
the ACCCs published work. Indeed the leaked departmental coordinating
comments suggests that at least four departments applied their econometric
expertise to reach the correct conclusion. So the problem was not one of
knowledge or training it was one of incentives. Any bureaucrat who stood
up to point out the errors in the ACCC report would be doing more than
leaning against the wind. In standing up to a new government that may be
in o¢ ce for two or more terms they would be making what is known as a
career limiting move.
16The Senate Standing Committee on Economics National Fuelwatch (Empowering Con-
sumers) Bill 2008 National Fuelwatch (Empowering Consumers) (Consequential Amend-
ments) Bill 2008, October 2008, page 61.
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Second, after having made a decision for narrow political purposes gov-
ernments have a strong incentive to dress that decision upin the clothes
of respectability by selectively using facts that support the decision. Once
a government engages in such practices it becomes di¢ cult for voters to
distinguish between true evidence-based policy making and policy-based ev-
idence. The result is a general loss of faith in government and in its claims
to base decisions on evidence.
Such nancial and political incentives make the realpolitikof evidence-
based-policy making much more di¢ cult than it might seem. Some of the
problems experienced in the United Kingdom with evidence-based-policy are
summarized in the following paragraph from Stilgoe, Irwin and Jones (2006)
In November 2006, a report from the Commons Select Com-
mittee on Science held a mirror to the fashion for evidence-based
policy. In some areas, the committee argued, evidence-based
has become a way to justify policy rather than a way to make
policy the evidence is found to suit the decision. Evan Harris,
a committee member and Liberal Democrat science spokesman,
said that the way some policies claimed to be evidence-based was
a fraud which corrupts the whole use of science in government.
Commitment to evidence-based-policy has a natural attraction to vot-
ers it conveys the hope that public policy decisions can be objective, rational
and informed by careful quantication of the evidence. But some government
decisions have to be made on the basis of ideology, convenience or whim be-
cause the evidence is inconclusive. The problem with the unqualied mantra
of evidence-based-decisionmaking is that it creates a false hope that gov-
ernments and their advisors cannot possibly meet. When they are inevitably
seen to fail in reaching this goal governments run the risk of damaging their
credibility and that of the evidence based approach.
6 Conclusion
Experience shows that good decisions are based on evidence that is tested.
The ACCC econometric evidenceused to justify the FuelWatch decision
was not adequately tested or evaluated. The actual econometrics was deeply
awed. When the econometrics is redone the ACCC conclusion can no longer
be supported.
This case study replicates the UK experience where it was found that
expert analysis was often misleading unless it was made robust by being
exposed to public scrutiny and scientic analysis. For econometric analysis
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the key criteria is that the data is publicly available and clearly described so
that the analysis can be replicated. Until the Australian government modies
its procedures in this way it cannot legitimately claim that its decisions are
evidence based.
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